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L REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants do not identify all of the material facts, because they limit their facts to 
the testimony at the TRO hearing. Even there they omit material facts: 
1. The REPC required that Plaintiffs apply for financing by September 1,2004. 
(Pi's Addendum, Ex 12 ^ [2.3 2.3(a) hereafter "REPC"; R at 880:23:17-18; R at 24). 
Plaintiffs timely applied for financing. (Id.) 
2. The REPC has provisions to cancel the sale if financing is denied. (REPC 12 
f2.3(b)). The Seller can cancel by written notice, and depending on the date either return 
the earnest money, or refund it. "A failure to cancel... shall have no effect on the 
Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a)." (Id) This means that the sale continues, 
but is still subject to the Buyer qualifying for financing as required in Section 2.2(a). The 
REPC also required Defendants to make Seller's disclosures (property description 
disclosures, title commitment, copies of leases and other problems) by September 15, 
2004. (REPC %% 7, 24) Defendants admit that they never performed this duty. (Jim's 
Depo 36:23-25; 37:1-3; Defs' Ans. to Pis' Request for Admissions 9:28) 
3. Defendants claim that as of October 5th 2004 that the REPC was no longer 
pursued by the parties. (Defendants' Brief at 12) However, the REPC was never 
cancelled by either party - and Plaintiffs testified that they had not abandoned the REPC 
and remained committed to acquiring the Ranch. (R at 880:25:17-18) Defendants knew 
Plaintiffs were still committed to purchase the Ranch. (Jim's Depo 80:1-6; R at 214) The 
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primary change between the REPC and the lease option was the method of payment for 
the Ranch. 
4. Plaintiffs communicated to Defendants that "we would get this property one 
way or another..." (R at 880:25:17-18). Defendants claimed in their facts that "Ty 
acknowledged that at first James exhibited little amenability to the lease option. 
(Defendants5 Brief at 12). However the complete reference should have included "[H]e 
(Jim) called me [Ty] back a day or two later and said he really liked the idea of the lease 
option." (R at 880:25:23-25) As the parties discussed the lease option, Plaintiff thought 
that the lease option embodied the amended terms between the parties. However, 
Plaintiffs never abandoned their rights under the REPC. (R at 880:30:7-25) 
5. Although Plaintiffs had ceased searching for conventional financing while they 
believed the Defendants were going to honor the lease option, Plaintiffs were ultimately 
able to obtain conventional financing from American National Bank. (R at 880:25:5-9). 
6. Defendants quote that the Plaintiff did not tender any money other the earnest 
money is taken out of context. (Defendant Brief at 13) Ty caused his attorney to send a 
formal tender of tender. (Rat 293). 
7. Defendants aver there was no agreement on the terms for the lease option. 
However, in Jim's deposition, he admitted that the terms in the lease option were the 
same as the REPC. (R at 73;74:1-21; Jim's Depo 45:20-25) 
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8. Defendants alleged problems with the realtors listing agreements on October 
28. On Oct 29, David Farnsworth talked to the realtors and resolved the problem. (R at 
263; ) On that same day there were 5 conversations between David and Jim (Jims' Depo 
82:23-25. 83,84:1-22). Defendants ask the court to believe that at no time during these 
conversations was this major problem with the realtors being discussed. 
9. Defendants magnanimous gesture to offer the property to Plaintiffs on 
November 8,2004 was deceptions and disingenuous. Defendants and Gibson signed an 
offer on November 4, 2004. (R at 274; Jim Depo p 101:1-14; 107:13-24). Defendants 
could not have sold the property to Plaintiffs on November 8, 2004. Note, Jim 
contradicted himself after testifying that he signed a REPC addendum on November 4, he 
denied that he had a deal with Gibson. (Jim Depo 110:4-9) 
10. Ty was asked in the TRO hearing if the Farnsworth's ever signed the Lease 
Agreement. He answered "no". In reality, there is no way for Plaintiff to know whether 
or not the Defendants signed it. A signed copy was never returned nor produced. The 
Lease Option (R at 11) is a copy of the original mailed by Ty to Jim. That original has 
never been seen by Plaintiffs since. Defendants deny having the original. Because the 
original has not been produced it is not known if it was or was not executed. Defendants 
have never testified whether or not they actually signed the lease option. 
11. Defendants rely on Plaintiffs statement at the TRO hearing if he had tendered 
money after the closing date had passed, to which Ty said no. (R at 880:48:13-13) 
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However, Ty did have his attorney send a tender and demand for performance. (R at 
293) 
12. Defendants allege that there is no evidence that they would not have accepted 
the REPC amount, had it been tendered. While this is a question of fact for trial, it is 
suspect. Defendants had already signed an earnest money offer as of November 4. (R at 
274) The "offer" to Plaintiffs at the higher price was given November 8. Jim stated that 
he told Ty "to make an offer he could afford and sit in a back up position." (Jims Depo 
93:19-20.) Defendants were not going to accept the $339,000 purchase amount. 
H. ARGUMENTS. 
A. Issue: the District Court Failed to Grant AH Reasonable Inferences and 
Undisputed Facts in Favor of the Plaintiff When it Issued Summary 
Judgment in Favor of the Defendants. 
Plaintiffs never abandoned the REPC. (R at 880:25:17-18) Defendants allege that 
they considered the REPC to have been abandoned by both parties. However, Defendants 
never formally cancelled the REPC. The district court found that the REPC was 
abandoned. Because this is a material fact, summary judgment should not have issued. 
Defendants claim Plaintiffs never tendered, but ignore the letter of November 9, 
2004. U.C.A. §78-27-1 and case law of SHIELDS v. HARRIS, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah 
App. 1997) which state that tender is sufficient without an actual production. 
Defendants' Brief claims the parties never reached an agreement on the necessary 
terms to make the lease option enforceable. (Defendant's Brief at 17) However 
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Defendants admit that the terms in the lease option were the same as the REPC. (R at 
73;74:1-21:) Defendants cannot rely on general denials and ignore specific admissions. 
Plaintiffs claim the actions of the Defendants demonstrate that they abandoned 
rights in the REPC for new obligations and rights in the lease option. Jim claimed he told 
Ty to not do work at the Ranch after he found out that Ty had done work. However, 
Plaintiffs list several invitations to come to the Ranch, an acknowledgment that Jim was 
glad that Ty had visited and worked on the Ranch, extensive demonstrations of the water 
system and discussions on Ranch operations, the order to Bastian to remove his cattle, 
together with "side deals" as indications that the Defendants agreed to the lease option. 
Summary judgment should not be granted if there are other equally plausible 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See GOODNOW v. SULLIVAN, 2002 UT 21, f 
18,44 P.3d 704 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) ("Where, as here, equally plausible 
contrary inferences may be drawn, neither party should have been granted summary 
judgment."). Indeed, 
It takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. REEVES V. GEIGY 
PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., 764 P.2d 636,640 (Utah CtApp. 1988). 
Defendants5 facts are limited to testimony at the TRO hearing. The hearing did not 
constitute a complete examination of all of the salient facts in this case. In a summary 
judgment a party can allege facts by affidavit, which must be construed in that party's 
favor if summary judgment is awarded to the other party. U.R.C.P. Rule 56. Such facts 
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cannot be ignored. If the facts are material and are disputed, they must be resolved by 
trial. Plaintiffs established 19 facts by affidavit which are mostly undisputed and which 
preclude summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Summary judgment is inappropriate 
when those facts controvert other facts or denials asserted by Defendants. 
This appeal should not be resolved on the simplistic approach taken by 
Defendants. Even assuming, arguendo, that such an approach has merit, there are material 
facts in dispute which leave unresolved questions. 
1. If Defendants' claim that the REPC was abandoned, why was 
Plaintiffs' earnest money not returned? 
2. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs never tendered money for the lease 
option. But Defendants still had the earnest money, were they 
keeping it for the lease option or the REPC? 
3. Why did Defendants never cancel the REPC under its terms? 
4. How could summary judgment be proper in this case without 
considering the Defendants actions, including allowing the Plaintiffs 
to work and stay overnight; detailed negotiations for the lease option 
which mirrored the terms of the REPC; making side deals for 
animals; and Defendants teaching the Plaintiffs about the water 
systems - after the REPC was supposedly abandoned? 
5. After the court stated: "The court is not convinced that the Plaintiffs 
intended to abandon the REPC" (R at 880:68:10-12) no new 
information was presented showing the Plaintiffs "abandonment" of 
the REPC. Plaintiffs did sign affidavits affirming their testimony in 
the TRO that they had not abandoned the REPC - yet the court held 
the REPC was abandoned. With no new evidence of abandonment 
how can the court decide at a later date that it was abandoned? 
6. Plaintiffs may have been inartful with their complaints, but they 
never abandoned their quest to enforce the REPC. 
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7. The court did not find any tender. (R at 665) The court simply failed 
to consider the tender of November 9 as being a material fact in 
dispute as to whether actual tender would have been fruitless. 
B. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Specific Performance of a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract after the Defendants Failed to Perform and after 
the Plaintiffs Tendered Their Performance? 
The REPC grants a Buyer the right to sue for specific performance or damages 
upon the default of the Seller. (REPC % 16) This paragraph also states that the denial of a 
loan application is not a default. Therefore the Plaintiffs were never in default. 
Defendants however, failed to provide the disclosures required in [^7. Defendants also 
unilaterally cancelled escrow. (Addendum Ex. 18: f 6) Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants 
ever cancelled the contract. The REPC has no requirement offender, Plaintiffs may sue 
for specific performance without tendering. See, SLW/UTAH, RYAN V. DAN!S FOOD 
STORES, INC., 972 P.2d 395,402 (Utah 1998) (explaining the law recognizes the right of 
people "to freely contract, establishing terms and allocating risks between them"). The 
law even permits parties to enter into unreasonable contracts or contracts leading to a 
hardship on one party. See BEKINS BAR v. RANCH V. HUTH, 664 P.2d 455,459 (Utah 
1983). Here, Defendants contracted away their right to demand tender under the REPC. 
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs9 tender was ineffective, citing SHIELDS V. HARRIS, 
934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1997). Shields never tendered. Instead Shields claimed 
that tender would have been futile. This court concurred, and held that because of Harris' 
unreasonable refusal of more money than was due under the option that specific 
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performance was appropriate. Harris fits with the facts of this case. Defendants told Ty 
that they would accept $390,000 - $51,000 more than the REPC amount. Defendants did 
not tell Ty that the REPC was invalid, only that they wanted more money to honor it. In 
this case it would have been futile for Plaintiffs to have actually tendered the money. 
In CARR V. ENOCH SMITH CO., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1989) Carr agreed to 
purchase a home in 1978, but failed to timely seek a loan. In 1979 Carr's earnest money 
was returned. Later Carr's attorney sent a letter to Smith's real estate agent expressing 
Carr's intent to perform under the terms of the contract. Smith's attorney replied that his 
client considered the agreement to have been terminated by Carr's failure to attain the 
loan. Six months later, an action for specific performance was commenced. The Carr 
court did not discuss U.C.A. § 78-27-1, but required an actual tender. That court was not 
convinced that Carr would have been able to provide actual tender, and even if he could, 
Carr was not entitled to specific performance because specific performance is a equitable 
remedy, and in order to seek equity one must do equity. Here the facts are significantly 
different. The Plaintiffs timely sought financing, the earnest money was not returned, the 
Plaintiffs stayed very involved with the Ranch. Plaintiffs are seeking equity, and acted in 
good faith throughout the transaction. Defendants on the other hand fail the equity test. 
They did not attempt to terminate the REPC, did not refund the earnest money, and acted 
as if the lease option would be completed. At the last moment they accepted another 
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offer, but made a phony claim to give the Plaintiffs a chance to buy the property at a 
higher rate - although they had already signed a binding contract with Gibson. 
In CENTURY 21 ALL WESTERN REAL ESTATE V. WEBB, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) 
the parties were in conflict over whom should remove a third party lien. Although there 
was a contract in place, the parties were in dispute over the terms. A letter tendering 
performance was held insufficient in light of the facts related to the dispute. The court 
did not discuss U.C.A. § 78-27-1. The court required actual tender because there was no 
"time is of the essence" clause. Id at 56. Because of the dispute over terms an actual 
tender would have included the solution to the lien. This case is not applicable here. The 
terms of the REPC are not disputed. Defendants wanted more than the REPC price. 
In JENKINS V. EQUIPMENT CENTER, INC., 869 P.2d 1000 (Utah App. 1994) Jenkins 
owed that Defendant money for tractor repairs and an open account. That Defendant 
refused to release the tractor until both the repairs and open account were paid in full. 
The argument there concerned whether actual tender by Jenkins would have been futile, 
and whether tender for tractor repairs alone would have been sufficient. That court also 
found that the Defendant was entrenched in its demand, and that an actual tender would 
have been futile. The court did not discuss U.C.A. § 78-27-1. 
In HACKFORD V. SNOW, 657 P.2d 1271, fn 7 (Utah 1982) a case involving specific 
performance, that court noted with approval that a letter tendering performance without 
actual cash satisfied U.C.A. § 78-27-1. 
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Two questions must be resolved, (A) whether the November 9 letter was sufficient 
tender and (B) whether actual tender would have been futile. The cited cases are fact 
specific, and the facts control the result. Most of the cases involve the futility of actual 
tender. CARR required actual tender, but was doubtful that Carr could perform.. Under 
these cases, actual tender should be excused because it would have been futile. 
Defendants allege that there is no evidence that they would not have accepted the 
REPC amount, had it been tendered. However, Defendants had already signed an earnest 
money offer with Gibson as of November 4. The "offer" to Plaintiffs at the higher price 
was given November 8. But Jim told Ty "to make an offer he could afford and sit in a 
back up position." (Jim's Depo 93:19-20.) That is a pretty clear admission that any 
lower offer - including the REPC amount for $51,000 less would not be accepted, neither 
would the offer for $390,000 be accepted because Defendants already had accepted an 
offer for $400,000 on November 4. 
The plain language of §78-27-1 should prevail. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, V. 
STEVENSON, ^ 32.2006 UT 84. U.C.A. §78-27-1 is not ambiguous and should be applied 
as written. 
C. Issue: Are Appellants Entitled to the Benefit of Promissory Estoppel 
Arising out of an Oral Agreement Modifying Terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement into a Lease Option? 
This case provides an opportunity to clarify the law of promissory estoppel as 
applied to cases under the Statute of Frauds. First is whether there are any exceptions to 
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the Statute of Frauds requirements. "[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel ha[s] been 
extended, in a limited form, to those cases concerned with . . . the [s]tatute of [f|rauds, 
where the promise as to future conduct constitute^] the intended abandonment of an 
existing right of the promissor." McKlNNON 529 P.2d at 436; see also STANGL, 948 P.2d 
at 363. FERICKS V. LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, 2004 UT 85 100 P.3d 1200 %U (Utah 2004). 
The second inquiry is whether there was an abandonment of an existing right of 
the promisor. One critical fact is the REPC was subject to the Ranch appraising for 
$339,000 - but earlier that year the Ranch had only appraised for $315,000. (R at 502) 
There is no evidence of any change which would have caused the Ranch to appraise for 
more, thus the Defendants had to be greatly motivated to find another avenue to obtain 
the sales price. Without the lease option, Plaintiffs would be free to walk away from the 
REPC. However, the lease option guaranteed the sale, because there was no appraisal 
clause. So Defendants abandoned their right to a cash sale in exchange for the lease 
option avoiding the appraisal clause. 
The third inquiry is whether [t]he acts and conduct of the promissor must so clearly 
manifest an intention that he will not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would 
be to work a fraud upon the other party." (McKlNNON, 529 P.2d at 437; see also STANGL, 
948 P.2d at 363.) The 19 facts point to the lease option. The last leg of this test is 
whf'.tn.p'f ^cq.^rfinjl. Off "Hip; f^^oiiifry. ^J*.)} \vrivlr p fypH^ =on "Ptp^ntlfff?, Tl^.VP-, if* t"h^ S t a t u t e ^S 
asserted the Plaintiffs are deprived the Ranch. Note that any number of events could have 
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made a difference, including formal cancellation of the REPC, return of the earnest 
money, a clear repudiation of the lease option - however, none occurred. At the last 
minute while the Plaintiffs were relying in good faith on the promises and conduct of the 
Defendants , they elected to drop the Plaintiffs for a higher price. Not only is this grossly 
inequitable, it is fraudulent. 
If there is a limited exception for promissory estoppel, it could follow these facts. 
The parties entered into an enforceable REPC, which was not cancelled. The Defendants 
abandoned their rights (immediate principal) under the REPC for new rights in the lease 
option (deferred principle with monthly payments). 
Plaintiffs acted in reliance of the Defendants' words and actions, by ceasing to 
search for financing for the REPC. These actions convinced the Plaintiffs that the 
Defendants would honor the lease option. It was only deception by the Defendants that 
prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining financing and insisting on closing prior to October 24. 
The Statute is not "eviscerated" if promissory estoppel is granted. The Defendants 
had every opportunity to make a clear statement that there was no existing deal between 
the parties. Defendants could have returned the earnest money, cancelled the REPC in 
writing, made any number of definitive statements that there was not a deal between the 
parties, could have denied Plaintiffs access to the Ranch, could have refused to teach the 
Plaintiffs about Ranch operations, and other similar actions. However, Defendants gave 
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no indication that they considered the REPC invalid or that they would not perform under 
the lease option. 
Utah has other case law regarding the Statute of Frauds which supports Plaintiffs5 
arguments. In a case based on statute of frauds language, this court stated: 
When an oral agreement has been made, ,f[o]ne or more writings, not all of 
which are signed by the party to be charged, may be considered together as 
a memorandum [of the agreement] for purposes of the statute of frauds if 
there is a nexus between them." MACHAN HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, INC. V. 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CO., 779 P.2d 230,234 (Utah 
App. 1989) (Emphasis added) 
The nexus requirement is satisfied either by express or implied reference gleaned from the 
writings and the circumstances. BIRDZELL v. UTAH OIL REFINING CO., 121 Utah 412,242 
P.2d 578, 580 (1952); see NEY V. HARRISON, 5 Utah 2d 217,299 P.2d 1114,1118 (1956) 
("set out the conditions of the transaction with adequate certainty"). Furthermore, "the 
memorandum must show what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that some 
contract was made." COLLETT v. GOODRICH, 119 Utah 662,231 P.2d 730, 732 (1951). 
Here the signed REPC has a direct nexus to the unsigned lease option. Both 
documents recite the same basic terms, including identity of the parties, property, 
purchase price and terms. The main difference between the REPC and the lease option is 
that the lease option provides for a three year term for the Plaintiffs to consummate the 
purchase. (Jims Depo, 45:20-25) Since neither party cancelled the REPC the chain 
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between it and the lease option is unbroken. Defendants' conduct1 ratifies that they 
believed there was an agreement between the parties. Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit 
of their agreements with the Defendants. 
D. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Damages for Breach of Contract If 
Claims for Specific Performance and Promissory Estoppel Are Denied? 
Defendants give two reasons why contract damages are not available to Plaintiffs. 
First reason: Plaintiffs did not make a contract claim in their amended complaints. 
Response: The headings read "COMPLAINT: BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE 
OF REAL PROPERTY." All complaints alleged that "Plaintiffs are entitle to their 
damages as proven at trial." A similar request is made in the closing prayer. The 
"Alternate Recovery" in the Amended Complaint includes %4l a request for damages, and 
was also included in the closing prayer. In Plaintiffs' Answer to Counterclaim, 
Affirmative Defenses [^2 states the agreements create an enforceable contract; [^11 states 
the amended complaint sets forth additional causes of action and was not a dismissal of 
the earlier causes of action. Finally the parties argued contract damages in their motions 
for summary judgment. 
Under Rule 8(f), URCP, pleadings are to be construed to do substantial justice, and 
Rule 15 allows for pleadings to conform to the evidence. Here there is no question but 
1
 On October 24, 2004 Ty spoke with Kent Bastian who leased the Ranch for his cattle. 
Kent said that Jim had told him to remove his cattle from the Ranch by November 1 because the 
Ranch was sold. (R at 218-21; 229; 253-255; 279, Jim's Depo 37:4-25; 39,39:1-7; 58:3-20) 
The Gibson offer was not presented until about October 29. (R at 266-277) The only interested 
party before October 24 were the Plaintiffs. 
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that the Defendants understood that one of the Plaintiffs' claims was for breach of 
contract and damages arising therefrom. 
Defendants' second objection is that neither party can be in default until the other 
has tendered its own enforcement. Plaintiffs tendered their performance by letter dated 
November 9,2004. 
Sellers first defaulted when they failed to provide disclosures (REPC |^7) due 
September 15. Note that [^16 states that "Denial of a loan application made by the Buyer 
is not a default." Under the terms of the REPC the Plaintiffs were never in default. 
The REPC provides in [^16. "If Seller defaults .. Buyer may sue Seller to 
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law." 
Significantly the REPC does not require the non-defaulting party to tender performance 
before commencing suit. Thus under the REPC, Plaintiffs are entitled to sue for specific 
performance or damages. 
E. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Enforcement of the Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Relating to the Repc And/or Lease Option? 
Defendants claim they acted in good faith and under their contract rights. The 
REPC required certain performances by both parties. Defendants defaulted by failing to 
deliver the disclosures, title commitment and lease information; they also unilaterally 
cancelled escrow at the title company. (Addendum Ex. 18: f6) Defendants did not notify 
the Plaintiffs that they believed the REPC was terminated or cancelled. At the same time, 
Defendants led the Plaintiffs to believe that the lease option was accepted by continuing 
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to invite Plaintiffs to the Ranch and teaching Plaintiffs about Ranch operations, even after 
the closing date in the REPC. Then Defendants extended the realtor problem to buy time. 
Defendants intentionally secreted the existence of the Gibson offer (received October 29) 
when they were with the Plaintiffs at the Ranch on October 30. Plaintiffs allege that the 
Defendants intentionally conjured up a problem with the realtors as an excuse not to 
close, when at least one of them knew the problem was resolved.2 When Plaintiffs 
tendered their performance, the tender was ignored. The Defendants intentionally did 
these things to destroy the right of the Plaintiffs to the fruits of the contract. However: 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly 
promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." 
ST. BENEDICT'S DEV. CO. V. ST. BENEDICT'S HOSP., 811 P.2d 194,199 (Utah 
1991). 
Defendants allege the REPC expired by its own terms. The time is of the essence 
clause relates to the dates in the contract. (REPC f 21) However, that limitation does not 
limit the Plaintiffs' right to enforce the contract after Defendants' default. REPC [^16 is 
not time limited. Even if the time of essence terminated the contract, the Defendants' 
deceit extends Plaintiffs' time to tender and enforce. RUSSELL PACKARD DEV., 
INC. v. CARSON, 2005 UT 14, J 28,108 P.3d 741. 
2
 That Plaintiffs learned the Ranch was still listed may have calmed them, but it does not 
excuse Defendants ruse to avoid closing for over a week when the problem had been resolve the 
very next day - and the Defendants were in frequent daily contact with each other. 
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F. Issue: Did the Court Properly Interpret the Plaintiffs' Pleadings, 
Motions to Amend Their Complaints and Motion to Conform under 
Rule 15? 
State and Federal courts are divided about the application of Rule 15. However, 
Defendants did not respond to the ruling in COWLEY V. PORTER, 2005 UT App 518, but 
instead rely primarily on Nebraska law. This court should reaffirm the ruling and analysis 
in PORTER. The Defendants' narrow reading of Rule 15 cannot be reconciled with 
Porter's liberal interpretation of the rules - to accomplish "substantial justice." 
Defendants complain that they are prejudiced, but give no evidence and fail to 
mention what facts or issues on which they would have needed additional discovery. 
Prejudice is shown when one party obtains an advantage; creation of a delay (not shown 
here); or a substantial increase in the costs of litigation. Cf. SMILE INC. V. BRITESMILE 
MANAGEMENT, 122 P.3d 654 (UT App 2005). In SPEROS V. FRICKE, 98 P.3d 28, fn 2 (UT 
2004) it was held the prevailing party cannot claim prejudice. COMMERCIAL CARRIERS V. 
INDUSTRIAL COMM'N, 888 P.2d 707, 713 (Utah CtApp. 1994) held the test for substantial 
prejudice is whether [Defendants were] given full and fair consideration of the issues. 
If Defendants were truly prejudiced they would have to show that the outcome 
would have been different. However they already prevailed. All Plaintiffs are doing is 
preserving the issues for appeal by seeking reformation of their complaint. 
Defendants incorrectly state that pleadings may not be amended after trial - Rule 
15(b) states that "amendments of the pleadings ... at any time, even after judgment...." 
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Defendants also complain that issues raised on reconsideration were improper. 
Again their argument fails for lack of prejudice. Defendants argued the issues fully and 
the court responded - in their favor. 
G. Issue: Is ILC.A. §78-40-2.5 in Conflict with Established Rules of Utah 
Law, or Unconstitutional for Depriving Plaintiffs of Due Process? 
The district court accepted the bond proffered by Plaintiffs as a condition on 
leaving the lis pendens in place. (R at 876) Plaintiffs recognize the possible justicability 
issue. However, since the Plaintiffs may be at risk for a future motion to set aside the lis 
pendens they encourage this court to address the constitutionality of this statute. 
In WICKHAM v. FISHER the Supreme Court stated: 
The principles that determine the justiciability of the instant case are the 
well-established rules which permit a court to litigate an issue which, 
although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the time of appeal, is 
of wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a similar 
manner, and, because of the brief time any one person is affected, would 
otherwise likely escape judicial review. The law provides no exemption 
from judicial scrutiny of unlawful acts which are likely to be repeated 
because they do not fall within the usual principles of standing and 
justiciability. 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981) 
The statute is internally conflicted, and should be corrected to avoid uneven and unfair 
application of the statute. U.C.A. §78-40-2.5(3) purports to be mandatory; Subsection 5 
allows a court to disregard the mandatory subsection 3. Subsection 3 disabuses a litigant 
of due process. Different courts will read this statute and come to substantially different 
solutions. Judicial economy is preserved by this court clarifying what due process is 
appropriate for a litigant involving claims to real property. 
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Defendants9 damages are speculative. The loss of the Gibson sale would be a 
benefit to the Defendants, since the property has substantially appreciated over the past 
two years. Defendants could easily sell the property for more than it was sold to Gibson. 
And the purchase price is in escrow - and on Gibson's default could go to Defendants 
H. Issue: Are Plaintiffs Entitled to Their Attorney Fees in the Lower 
Court and If They Prevail on Their Appeal? 
The REPC has a clause granting attorney fees if a party prevails in its enforcement 
of the REPC. (R at 236, % 17). PANOS V. OLSEN AND ASSOCIATES CONST., INC., 123 P.3d 
816, 822 (Utah 2005); MANAGEMENT SERVS. CORP. V. DEVELOPMENT ASSOCS., 617 P.2d 
406 (Utah 1980). 
One remedy of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the grant of attorney 
fees. LIEBERV. ITT HARTFORD INS. CTR. INC., 15P.3d 1030,^16 (Utah 2000). 
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO. INS. CO., 65 P.3d 1134, n 20, (Utah 2001). 
in . DEFENDANTS CROSS APPEAL 
A. Whether the Lis Pendens is Proper and Whether the Refusal to 
Remove it Creates a Wrongful Lien. 
Defendants seek to create new law from Florida as the means to justify their claim. 
Their theory is based on erroneous facts. Their first justification is that the Plaintiffs 
abandoned the REPC. However, there is no evidence to support it, and Plaintiffs 
vigorously assert that they never abandoned the REPC. Defendants second justification 
is that the lease option was not signed. (It may have been signed, but it was not returned 
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to the Plaintiffs.) The promissory estoppel claim together with the Plaintiffs' rights under 
the REPC are viable legal claims - both are claims which seek title and possession of real 
property. 
The Plaintiffs's filing has not been shown to be frivolous. Substantial legal issues 
arising from the REPC and lease option are presented in this court for resolution. 
The legislature intended the lis pendens statute to be broad, as the plain language 
so reads. The legislature could have restricted the rights of a filer, but chose not to do so. 
Courts routinely enforce the plain language of a statute, giving deference to legislative 
prerogatives. STATE V. WALLACE, 2006 UT 86 % 9 (When interpreting a statute, we must 
generally presume the legislature used each term thoughtfully.) See also, STATE V. 
TOOELE COUNTY, 44 P.3d 680 flO (Utah 2002.) 
Defendants' arguments propose a result which would lead to inconsistent 
judgments. Because the district court ruled for Defendants, they assume that the lis 
pendens was retroactively illegal. However, if this court reverses the district court then 
the Plaintiffs' rights to file the lis pendens is affirmed. However, if the court follows the 
Defendants' argument, the Plaintiffs' primary remedy will have been eliminated, since the 
sale to Gibson would occur immediately and due process for Plaintiffs would be denied. 
The Utah Supreme court stated: "The recording of a lis pendens serves as a 
warning to all persons that any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are 
subject to the judgment or decree." BAGNALL V. SUBURBIA LAND CO., 579 P.2d 914,916 
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(Utah 1978). A lis pendens is a warning, not a lien. In the instant case Defendants were 
able to sell to the Gibson buyers. Defendants are not harmed by the maintenance of the 
lis pendens, since they are able to collect interest on the purchase fiinds until this matter is 
resolved - an arrangement to which Defendants agreed with Gibson. These Defendants 
are not harmed by the lis pendens, and do not have standing to object to it. 
Under U.C.A. §39-9-2(2) a lis pendens is specifically authorized: 
The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law. 
The plain reading of this section is that a lis pendens can be filed without fear of reprisal 
under §39-9-2. Section 39-9 was reviewed and amended in 2005.3 Had the legislature 
considered that a lis pendens could be a wrongful lien, it would have so stated. Instead, 
the sole reference to lis pendens is to state that the wrongful lien statute did not exclude 
the filing of a lis pendens. 
A wrongful lien is defined in §38-9-4(6): 
Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or 
another state or federal statute;... 
A lis pendens is authorized under §78-40-2 which allows the notice when an action 
affecting the title or possession of real property has been filed. Such action was filed, and 




There is no need for a "good faith" requirement because the lis pendens statute is 
clear on its face. A lis pendens is wrongful if not filed properly. Instituting a good faith 
requirement will require a factual determination of whether the filer acted in good faith, 
and will introduce some arbitrariness into a statute which is presently clear and plain. 
The Defendants9 claim for relief under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is moot. An issue is "moot 
when "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." BENNION V. 
SUNDANCE DEV. CORP., 897 P.2d 1232,1234 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). The Gibson contract 
was made subject to the outcome of this lawsuit. Pursuant to the contract funds have 
been deposited, and are earning interest. If the Defendants prevail in the lawsuit, the 
Gibson contract will be fulfilled and the Defendants will have the funds pursuant to the 
terms of the Gibson REPC. Whether or not the lis pendens is removed will not affect the 
rights of the Defendants, because the Gibson contract will still be subject to the outcome 
of this lawsuit. (Rat 275) 
In JENKINS v. SWAN, 675 P.2d 1145,1149 (Utah 1983) the court stated: 
Through our case law, we have developed the requirement that a party have 
standing in order "to confine the courts to a role consistent with the 
separation of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those 
disputes which are most efficiently and effectively resolved through the 
judicial process." 
The relief requested by Defendants is more properly resolved in the legislature than in the 
courts. In order to grant Defendants' request, the current law will need to be substantially 
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altered, with new language and new interpretations. This is not the province of the 
courts. 
B. Whether Defendants Are Entitled to Their Legal Fees 
It is not contested that M[a]ttorney fees are generally recoverable in Utah only when 
authorized by statute or contract." PRINCE v. BEAR RIVER MUT.INS. CO., 2002 UT 68, ^  
52, 56 P.3d 524. Defendants argue here there is no contract. The controlling authority 
for almost 30 years is BLT INVESTMENT CO. V. SNOW, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978)/ There 
the Supreme Court held that parties ""may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, 
claim the benefit of the provision for attorney fees.1" Id. at 458. BLT was recently 
reaffirmed in BILANZICH v. LONETTI, 2005 UT App 522. In CHASE V. SCOTT, 2001 UT 
App 404, 38 P.3d 1001 the seller sued to rescind, but the buyer prevailed. Attorney fees 
were granted to the buyer. These cases are consistent - if the contract survives then 
attorney fees are granted; if the contract does not survive, no attorney fees can be granted 
because there is no agreement awarding fees. 
In CARR the Defendant prevailed but was not granted attorney fees because he was 
in a defensive posture and because of the limits of the attorney fee provision. In dicta 
CARR referred to MOUNTAIN STATES BROADCASTING CO. V. NEALE, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah 
App. 1989) which is not applicable to this case and has not been followed. There both 
4
 Other jurisdictions follow BLT, see KENNEDY V. GILLAM DEVEL. CORP., 80 
P.3d 927119 (Colo.App. 2003) for a list. 
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parties sued under an agreement seeking a money judgment and offsets - there was no 
dispute over the validity of the agreement. Neale's value lies with the prevailing party in 
relation to agreements which are not disputed as to enforcement. 
IV. SUMMARY 
There are material issues of fact at dispute precluding summary judgment on all 
issues. However, it is not disputed that the Plaintiffs never manifest they abandoned the 
REPC, while Defendants admit breaching their obligations - which standing alone grants 
Plaintiffs the right for specific enforcement. That both parties pursued the lease option 
does not defeat their right to enforce the underlying REPC. The REPC may have been 
abandoned by Defendants but it remains the writing forming the foundation of the lease 
option. Those writings with the Defendants' actions make the lease option valid. At a 
minimum the Plaintiffs are entitled to money damages for the Defendants' breach. The 
Defendants' bad faith makes them liable for breach of the covenant of good faith. 
Plaintiffs never abandoned their causes of action, and all were competently argued 
by Defendants. They never identified any element of prejudice. The amended complaints 
should be allowed to promote substantial justice and the liberal pleading rules. 
U.C.A. §78-40-2.5 is internally conflicted and ambiguous. It should not be 
interpreted to deprive filers of lis pendens their constitutional due process protections. 
The lis pendens was lawfully filed, and by statute is not an unlawful lien. 
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If Plaintiffs prevail on their enforcement of the REPC or lease option, are entitled 
to their attorney fees. Defendants, who deny the existence of an agreement cannot benefit 
from the agreement if they prevail. 
WHEREFORE 
Plaintiffs pray for the relief in their Appeals Brief, and request that Defendants' 
appeal be denied. 
Dated: ^ ^ W o 
Alvin K^LundgraS>---__J 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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